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DUTIES TO OFFSET COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES*
RICHARD B. DAGEN'
AND
MICHAEL S. KNOLL2
During the 99th Congress, several bills were introduced that would
have imposed duties to offset the competitive advantages allegedly en-
joyed by foreigners because of more lenient environmental and safety
standards overseas. These bills were based on a misconception about
the gains from trade and, if they had been enacted, would have made
the United States poorer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 99th Congress, four bills were introduced to impose
duties on imports of coal and copper that would have imposed duties to
offset the lower costs incurred by foreign producers to meet their na-
tions' less stringent environmental, health, welfare and safety require-
ments.8 The bills died when Congress adjourned. However, because of
* The authors would like to thank their colleagues at the International Trade
Commission, especially Richard Boltuck, Morris Morkre, Donald Rousslang, and Leo
Webb, for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts. The views
expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, who are responsible for any
remaining errors, and are not necessarily those of the U.S. International Trade
Commission.
1. A.B., The University of Chicago; A.M., M. Phil., Yale; J.D., Emory. Counsel
to the Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission.
2. A.B., A.M., Ph.D., J.D., The University of Chicago. Legal Advisor to the Vice
Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission.
3. Offsetting tariffs have been proposed in other areas. For example, an amend-
ment for section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp.
1986), would require that the President take action to eliminate or offset the competi-
tive advantages enjoyed by foreign countries that prohibit collective bargaining, pay
inadequate wages, or provide inadequate working conditions. H.R. 4800, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 112 (1986); see also H.R. Rep. 581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-34 (1986).
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the prominent role trade policy is expected to play in the 100th Con-
gress, the same bills, or at least similar ones, are likely to be reintro-
duced." Although there are differences among the four bills, they share
some basic characteristics.5 All of the bills observe that foreign produc-
ers do not have to meet the same costly statutory and regulatory re-
quirements as U.S. producers.6 The bills also assert that such cost dif-
ferences provide foreign producers with an unfair competitive
advantage." Finally, they employ the same remedy. Each bill would im-
pose a tariff on imports to offset the cost advantage foreign producers
allegedly enjoy by virtue of not having to meet U.S. regulatory
standards.8
Bills to offset competitive advantages should not be enacted be-
cause they are based on incorrect notions about the gains from trade.
Drafters and supporters of these bills fail to appreciate the benefits of
obtaining goods at lower cost. Such bills serve to reduce trade and
would cause the United States to become poorer. These bills are mod-
ern variations of the discredited scientific tariff,9 which was first en-
4. Farnsworth, Record Trade Deficit Seen As Election Issue, N.Y. Times, Aug.
30, 1986, at 31, col. 2; Washington Wire, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
5. As of September 1, 1986, three coal bills and one copper bill had been intro-
duced. The two coal bills pending in the House, H.R. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), and H.R. 1905, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985), are nearly identical. The third
coal bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 2356, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), as a
companion to the second house bill, to which it is very similar. The copper bill is S.
353, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). A bill similar to S. 353 was first introduced, on
October 20, 1977, as H.R. 9695, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
6. S. 2356, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(5) (1986): S. 353, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1985); H.R. 1905, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1985); H.R. 422, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
§ 2(5) (1985).
7. Id.
8. S. 353, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985); H.R. 1905, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4
(1985); H.R. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1985). Although Senator Rockefeller
describes S. 2356 as the Senate companion to H.R. 1905, 131 Cong. Rec. S. 4685
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 1986), S. 2356 places a fiat tariff on coal imports without increasing
or decreasing the tariff by the difference between domestic and foreign compliance
costs. S. 2356, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1986).
9. The logic of the scientific tariff carried to its ultimate conclusion would result in
an end to all trade. As Paul Samuelson, a Nobel Laureate in economics, and Peter
Temin have stated:
[I]f taken literally, [the scientific tariff] would mean the end to all trade! In its
usual form, tariffs should be passed to equalize the cost of production at home and
abroad. [A previous chapter] showed all the advantage from trade to rest on dif-
ferences in cost or advantage. If tariffs were passed raising the costs of all imports
to that of the highest home producer, no goods would come in at all.
P. Samuelson & P. Temin, Economics 698 (10th ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
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acted as part of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, and then reen-
acted as part of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.10 The scientific tariff
attempted to equalize costs of production across nations. Finally, if
such bills are enacted, they will violate the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATT"). Under GATT, countries injured by an off-
setting U.S. tariff have the right to retaliate.
II. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. The Coal Bill
The most recent and detailed bill introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives to offset the advantages enjoyed by foreign producers is
H.R. 1905, which would apply to coal imports." The first section of H.
R. 1905 sets forth the Congressional findings on which the proposed
tariff is based. The section states that (1) the United States possesses
vast coal reserves, (2) Congress is concerned by what it perceives to be
United States dependence on foreign energy sources, (3) the United
States does not restrict coal imports, (4) many foreign nations impose a
variety of constraints on imported coal, and (5) "foreign coal producers
are not required to comply with stringent environmental, health, wel-
fare and safety standards thereby giving foreign coal producers a com-
petitive advantage over domestic coal producers." ''
The two-fold purpose of the bill is set out in section 2(b). First, the
bill would establish as a base an $8 a ton duty on coal imports from
countries that have historically been net exporters of coal to the United
States. 3 Second, the bill would increase the duty to "offset any com-
10. Tarriff Act of 1930, ch. 479, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18, 19 and 28 U.S.C.) (the Smoot-Hawley Tariff); Tariff Act of 1922, ch.
356, 42 stat. 858 (the Fordney-McCumber Tariff).
11. H. R. 1905 is entitled "A Bill to Offset the Comparative Advantage which
Foreign Coal Producers Have as a Result of not Having to Meet Environmental,
Health,and Safety Requirements of the Kinds Imposed on United States Coal Produc-
ers and for Other Purposes." H.R. 1905, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985). The bill, which
was given the short title of the "Coal Trade Equalization Act of 1985," was introduced
on April 2, 1985 by Congressman Rahall of West Virginia for himself and for 19 other
members of Congress. H.R. 1905 is almost identical to H.R. 422, which had been
introduced by Congressman Rahall only three months earlier. S. 2356 was introduced
in the Senate in 1986 as a companion to H.R. 1905.
12. H.R. 1905, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1985).
13. See H.R. 1905, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. § 4(2) (1985), which sets the duty on
imported coal at $8 a ton. The current rate of duty for all classifications of coal is zero.
Zero is both the column I rate, which applies to countries that have most-favored-
nation status, and the column 2 rate, which applies to countries enumerated in general
headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States ("TSUS"). The United
1986]
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petitive advantage obtained by foreign producers of coal who are not
required to meet environmental, health and safety standards equivalent
to those imposed in the United States,"'14
The mechanics of the offsetting duty provision are contained in
section 4 of the bill. Section 4 amends the Tariff Schedules of the
United States ("TSUS") by providing a mechanism to increase or de-
crease the duty on coal upon petition by any interested party to the
Secretary of Commerce. The amount of increase or decrease in the
duty would be determined by calculating the difference between the
environmental, health, welfare and safety costs incurred by U.S. pro-
ducers with those incurred by foreign producers.1" Section 4 also pro-
States bound the duty rate for coal at zero in the 1947 Geneva Round of tariff negotia-
tions in the GATT.
14. H.R. 1905, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(1985).
15. Section 4 of H.R. 1905 reads in relevant part as follows:
SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE TARIFF SCHEDULES.
Subpart J of part 1 of schedule 5 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (19
U.S.C. 1202) is amended (1) by inserting immediately before item 521.11 the
following new headnote:
"SUBPART J HEADNOTE:
"1. (a) If the Secretary of Commerce (hereinafter in this headnote referred to
as the 'Secretary') determines and certifies under subdivision (b) of this headnote
that the duty imposed under item 521.34 on coal that is the product of a foreign
country must be increased or decreased, the President shall immediately proclaim
the duty as appropriately adjusted to reflect that increase or decrease.
"(b)(i) Any interested party may petition the Secretary, in such manner as
the Secretary shall prescribe, to determine whether the duty imposed under item
521.34 on coal that is the product of a foreign country should be increased or
decreased in accordance with clause (iii) of this headnote.
(ii) Upon receiving a petition under clause (i) of this headnote, the Secretary,
after consulting with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Labor, shall determine the envi-
ronmental, health, welfare, and safety cost for the foreign country concerned and
the United States environmental, health, welfare, and safety cost.
(iii) Based on the determinations made under clause (ii) of this headnote with
respect to a foreign country,
if -
"(I) the United States environmental, health, welfare, and safety cost exceeds
the foreign, environmental, health, welfare and safety cost, the Secretary shall im-
mediately certify the amount of the difference to the President as the amount by
which the duty imposed under item 521.34 on coal that is the product of that
foreign country must be increased; or
"(II) if the foreign environmental, health, welfare and safety cost exceeds the
United States environmental, health, welfare and safety cost, the Secretary shall
immediately certify the amount of the difference to the President as the amount by
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vides that coal will enter duty-free from countries that "historically"
have imported more coal from the United States than they have ex-
ported to it. 6 If a coal exporting country does not fit within the "his-
torical-importer" exemption, the bill provides that the amount of the
offsetting duty is determined by comparing environmental, health, wel-
fare and safety costs in the United States with those of the exporter's
country. If U.S. costs exceed the exporter's costs, the $8 a ton duty on
coal imported from that foreign country is increased by the differ-
ence.17 Alternatively, if foreign costs exceed the U.S. costs, the duty is
decreased by the difference.18
Section 4(d) sets out the procedure for calculating the offsetting
duty. According to the bill, the phrase "environmental, health, welfare
and safety purposes" generally refers to:
(I) the protection of the environment from the adverse effects re-
sulting from coal mining and processing;
(II) the protection of the health and welfare of workers engaged in
coal mining and processing; and
(III) the safety of workers engaged in coal mining and processing."
Section 4(d) then defines the foreign environmental, health, wel-
fare and safety cost as:
the average cost per ton incurred in the mining and processing of
coal that is attributable to compliance with laws and regulations of
which the duty imposed under item 521.34 on coal that is the product of that
foreign country must be decreased.
16. The bill does not state what period should be used to determine whether or not
a country is a historical net exporter of coal to the United States. In 1984, only the
Republic of South Africa, Colombia, Poland, and Argentina exported more coal to the
United States than they imported. The Position and Competitiveness of the United
States in World Coal Trade, USITC Pub. 1772, Inv. No. 332-182, at 28 (table 10), 34
(table 15) (Oct. 1985). Thus, these four countries are most likely to have to pay duties
if the bill is enacted.
17. H.R. 1905, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(1)(b)(iii)(1985).
18. Id. at § 4(l)(b)(iv). There are a number of other sections to the bill. Section 3
requires the Secretary of the Interior to investigate and report to Congress on the rela-
tionship between coal imports, the federal coal leasing program, and the condition of
the United States coal industry. If the Secretary finds that coal imports are adversely
affecting the leasing program and the domestic industry, he is directed to include ap-
propriate legislative recommendations in his report. Section 5 amends the Trade Act of
1974 to remove coal from the list of articles eligible for the Generalized System of
Preference. Section 6 makes the bill effective upon its enactment.
19. Id. at § 4(d)(i).
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the foreign country (and political subdivisions of that country) in
which the mining and processing occurs that pertain to environ-
mental, health, welfare and safety purposes.20
The bill attempts to compare the cost of foreign and domestic coal
that compete in the same region. Thus, the United States environmen-
tal, health, welfare and safety cost is defined as:
The average per ton cost that is attributable to compliance with all
Federal, State, and local laws and regulations that pertain to envi-
ronmental, health, welfare and safety purposes, and incurred in the
mining and processing of coal within the ... district or districts...
that could be reasonably expected to serve, or are serving, those
markets in the United States that are being penetrated by coal that
is the product of the foreign country.2"
B. The Copper Bill
The copper bill, S. 353, is entitled "A Bill to Increase the Duty on
Imported Copper by an Amount Which Offsets the Cost Incurred by
Copper Producers in the United States in Meeting Domestic Environ-
mental Requirements."2 The bill lists the following two purposes: (1)
to enhance the world environment by encouraging foreign copper pro-
ducers to adopt environmental measures substantially equivalent to
those employed in the United States and (2) to offset the cost advan-
tage enjoyed by foreign copper producers who do not employ environ-
mental measures substantially equivalent to those imposed on domestic
producers. 3 Unlike the coal bills, the copper bill purports to have as
one of its objectives the improvement of the environment in other coun-
tries. The mechanism for calculating the duty on imported copper is
similar to the mechanism found in the coal bills. 4
20. Id. at § 4(d)(ii).
21. Id. at § 4(d)(iii).
22. S. 353, called the Copper Environmental Equalization Act of 1985, was intro-
duced by Senator DeConcini of Arizona on January 31, 1985. 131 Cong. Rec. S913
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985).
23. S. 353, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985).
24. Section 3 of the bill raises the duty on imports of copper-bearing ores and
materials, copper metal, alloys, and its basic shapes and forms to 15 cents a pound on
the copper content, which is in addition to the duties imposed on the imports elsewhere
in the TSUS. Section 4 provides that the duty on imported copper will be adjusted by
the difference between the U.S. environmental cost of production and the sum of the
foreign environmental cost of production and the amount of duty, which is set at 15
cents a pound by section 3. Thus, if the U.S. environmental cost of production exceeds
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Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona, has made the only compre-
hensive statement in support of any of these bills. In support of the
Copper Bill, Senator DeConcini argued that the domestic copper indus-
try was suffering from unfair foreign competition. He stated:
At the heart of the copper industry's financial woes is unfair for-
eign competition. Domestic producers must compete in the same
international markets as foreign producers who may receive subsi-
dies from their own government or assistance for plant expansion
and rehabilitation through multilateral international financing or-
ganizations. At the same time, such plants do not have to invest
substantial sums of money to meet environmental standards like we
do in the United States.2
Senator DeConcini went on to argue that the price of copper pro-
duced in the United States exceeds the price of imported copper be-
cause of high United States wages, as well as strict domestic health
and environmental regulations:
Certainly wage scales and employee benefits, health and safety re-
quirements, and environmental regulations add to the costs of our
domestic copper production. Consequently, the price per pound of
copper produced in the United States is higher than copper pro-
duced in many foreign countries. However, the added costs to pro-
tect labor and our environment, I believe, are for the most part
warranted and worthwhile. These requirements reflect certain val-
ues which we, as Americans, feel are important sacrifices we must
make in order to protect the strength of our Nation, and in particu-
lar, the strength of our domestic labor force and long-term environ-
mental health. 6
the foreign cost by more than 15 cents a pound, then the duty on imported copper from
that country will be increased by the difference. Alternatively, if the sum of the foreign
environmental cost of production and the duty exceeds the U.S. cost, then the duty on
imported copper would be reduced by the difference. Section 9 defines the term "envi-
ronmental cost of production" as:
any cost incurred in the mining, milling, smelting, or refining of, or in any other
phase of the processing of, an article of copper that is attributable to compliance
with any law or regulation of the country in which such processing occurs which is
designed for the purpose of protecting the environment.
Id. at § 9(1).
25. 131 Cong. Rec. S913 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985).
26. Id.
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Senator DeConcini also noted that the costs of environmental con-
trols in the United States range from 10 to 15 cents on each pound of
copper produced, and that some foreign copper producers are not faced
with any environmental regulations. Senator DeConcini argues that
such a bill would achieve equity, without negatively impacting coun-
tries that compete fairly and have strong environmental regulations.
The Senator concludes as follows:
Until recently, Mr. President, our domestic copper industry was in-
ternationally competitive. As times and laws have changed, how-
ever, we have placed ourselves at an unfair economic disadvantage.
We, as a nation, need to assess our trade practices and priorities. I
believe environmental equalization is a very good place to start. It
will not only protect our industry here at home but it will make a
major contribution toward improving our global environment.17
III. OFFSETTING DUTIES As ECONOMIC POLICY
A tariff is a tool of economic policy, and it must stand or fall on its
economic effects. To understand how these proposed tariff bills would
affect American consumers and workers, it is first necessary to take a
short digression into economics, at the heart of which is the notion of
trade, or, in the jargon of economics, mutually beneficial exchange. In-
dividuals and nations, engage in trade in order to obtain goods and
services they value more than those they give up in exchange. Through
this process, trade allows individuals and nations to improve their allo-
cation of consumption goods.2 8 Production and trade are related be-
27. Id. at S914.
28. A traditional example of how trade allows individuals to improve their alloca-
tion of consumption goods involves two prisoners of war, one English and one French,
who each have a Red Cross parcel that contains one tin of coffee and one tin of tea.
The English soldier will drink coffee, but he values a tin of tea as much athe world
environment by encouraging foreign copper producers to adopt environmental measures
substantially equivalent to thins of tea. If the two soldiers are prevented from trading,
they will each have their original allocation of one tin of tea and one tin of coffee. This
original allocation is called the endowment. Using tins of tea as a unit of value, the
Englishman values his endowment as much as 1.5 tins of tea (1 unit for the tin of tea
and .5 units for the tin of coffee), and the Frenchman values his endowment as much
as 3 tins of tea (1 unit for the tin of tea and 2 units for the tin of coffee). The valua-
tions would be reversed if tins of coffee were used as the unit of measurement. If the
two soldiers are now permitted to trade, then the Frenchman would trade tea to the
Englishman for coffee. If the soldiers trade all of their coffee and tea, so that the Eng-
lishman ends up with the 2 tins of tea and the Frenchman with the 2 tins of coffee,
then using tins of tea as the measure of value, the Englishman will end up with 2 tins
1986] DUTIES TO OFFSET
cause they are alternative ways of obtaining the same goods and ser-
vices. Whether a nation chooses trade or production depends on which
is cheaper.o Nations specialize in producing the goods and services
they can produce relatively cheaply and trade these goods and services
for those goods and services it would cost them relatively more to pro-
duce. Thus, trade allows individuals and nations to specialize in the
production of certain goods and services and thereby increase the ag-
gregate amount that can be produced and consumed. This is known as
the principle of "comparative advantage."3 "
Tariffs decrease the incentive for nations to specialize, and thus
reduce the aggregate production and consumption of goods and ser-
vices."1 Furthermore, the tariffs provided for in the coal and copper
of tea and the Frenchman will value his 2 tins of coffee as much as 4 tins of tea. Once
again, the valuations are just reversed if coffee is used as the measure of value. Regard-
less of the measure used, however, both the Englishman and the Frenchman are made
better off by exchange. Both soldiers value their new parcels as much as they would
value a parcel of 1.33 tins of both tea and coffee. Because they each began with 1 tin of
tea and 1 tin of coffee, the process of exchange has created the equivalent of .67 tins of
coffee and .67 tins of tea. This example is derived from A. ALCHIAN & A. ALLEN,
EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE 39-46 (1969). A similar example can be
found in any basic economics text. See e.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND AP-
PLICATIONS 190-97 (2d ed. 1980).
29. A simple diagrammatic demonstration of this principle is contained in J.
HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 28, at 203-11.
30. The law of comparative advantage was first articulated by the English econo-
mist David Ricardo, who in 1817 showed that a nation can raise its real income by
specializing in the production of those goods that it can produce efficiently. D. RI-
CARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817). The law of com-
parative advantage is based on relative advantage, not absolute advantage. It implies
that a country will engage in trade even if it is more productive at producing every
good than its trading partners. For example, assume that in the United States a bushel
of wheat can be produced with 1 hour of labor, and a gallon of wine with 2 hours, but
that in France a gallon of wine requires 5 hours and a bushel of wheat 4 hours. With-
out trade, a gallon of wine would sell for 2 bushels of wheat in the United States and
1.25 bushels in France. If the United States and France engaged in trade, the United
States could get wine more cheaply by trading for it instead of producing it, even
though the United States is a more efficient producer of both wheat and wine. Simi-
larly, France could get wheat more cheaply by trading wine to the United States. Be-
cause the United States could obtain wine and France could obtain wheat more
cheaply by specializing and trading, they can both increase the amount of both wine
and wheat they consume through trade. See generally W. ETHIER, MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS ch. 1 (1983); J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 28, at ch. 7; P. LINDERT
& C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 18-25 (7th ed. 1982); P. SAMUEL-
SON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS ch. 38 (12th ed. 1985).
31. E.g., R. CAVES & R. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 205-10 (4th ed.
1985); W. ETHIER, supra note 30, at 168-71.
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bills are based on the same flawed reasoning as was the scientific
tariff.32 The scientific tariff was intended to equalize the cost of produc-
tion at home and abroad by imposing a tax to offset any foreign cost
advantage. Proponents argued that the scientific tariff was fair because
it provided "a level playing field." 33
A strict application of the scientific tariff would end all trade.34
Trade comes about because of differences in the cost of production
among nations.33 By raising the cost of imports to the level of the do-
mestic product, the scientific tariff would remove the incentive to im-
port, and would deny the United States the benefits of trade.36 For ex-
ample, if a scientific tariff were rigorously enforced, neither the United
States nor Colombia would have the incentive to trade computers for
coffee. Instead, the United States would have to produce all of the cof-
fee it consumes domestically at a tremendous cost in real resources.3s7
In contrast to the scientific tariff, which would offset all of the
32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. The scientific tariff is still in effect, although its scope has been severely lim-
ited, because it does not apply to goods that have been the subject of a tariff conces-
sion. Section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1983). Because tariff
concessions have been granted on most articles through the GATT multilateral trade
negotiations, few goods could be the subject of an investigation under section 336. Sec-
tion 336 empowers the U.S. International Trade Commission to investigate and report
to the President on the differences in the costs of production of domestic and competi-
tive imported articles and to specify the rates necessary to equalize the differences. See
J. DOBSON, Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS 101-05 (1976). For example, if it costs $3 to
produce a bushel of grapes in the United States and $2 to produce the same bushel in
France, then the scientific tariff on a bushel of grapes would be $1. The tariff and its
trade inhibiting effect are directly proportional to the magnitude of the cost difference.
Thus, coffee could be grown in the United States using green houses, but it would cost
a lot more. A scientific tariff would make coffee prohibitively expensive.
34. See D. SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMics 213 (1983); P. SAMUELSON
& P. TEMIN, EcONOMics 698 (10th ed. 1976).
35. E.g., R. CAVES & R. JONES, supra note 31, at 36-37; W. ETHIER, supra note
30, at 18-21; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 30, at 831-34.
36. Paul Samuelson and Peter Temin have commented about the scientific tariff
as follows:
There is nothing scientific about such a tariff. It is a grave reflection on the eco-
nomic literacy of the American people that this least defensible of all protectionist
arguments has tremendous political importance in our history.
P. SAMUELSON & P. TEMIN, supra note 34, at 698. See also W. ETHIER, supra note 30
at 216.
37. It might be argued that no one would grow coffee in the United States be-
cause it would be too expensive, so the scientific tariff does not apply. Although coffee
could not be profitably grown in the United States at the current market price, the
scientific tariff would protect someone who wanted to grow coffee in the United States
by raising the price to a level at which it could be profitably grown.
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differences in the cost of production across nations, the coal and copper
bills would only offset some of the differences, specifically the costs of
complying with government-mandated environmental and health regu-
lations. These compliance costs are among the social costs of producing
coal and copper in the United States. The social costs of producing coal
and copper domestically also include the harm to workers and the dam-
age to the environment, as well as the costs that are incurred to reduce
these harms, whether they are mandated by a government or not. 38
In order to limit the environmental damage caused by coal and
copper production, there are a wide variety of environmental regula-
tions that apply to domestic industries.39 The justification for such envi-
ronmental regulations is well-known in the economic literature. Pollu-
tion is known as an "externality." 40 Individual firms have little
incentive to reduce pollution because they bear only a small fraction of
the cost of the ill effects.41 There will, therefore, be too much pollution
in an unrestricted market because the polluters and the affected public
are not in a contractual relationship.4 2 Environmental regulations,
which often require large expenditures by the affected manufacturers,
limit the amount of pollution that can be produced. 3
38. Even at very large cost, the ill effects to workers and the environment could
not be eliminated entirely.
39. For a discussion of regulations affecting the coal industry, see M. ZIMMERMAN,
THE U.S. COAL INDUSTRY: THE ECONOMICS OF POLICY CHOICE chs. 1 & 4 (1981).
40. A common definition of an externality is "[a]n effect of one economic agent
on another that is not taken into account by normal market behavior." W. NICHOLSON,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 690 (3d ed. 1983).
41. See R. STROUP & J. BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 86-87 (1983).
42. The absence of a contractual relationship is critical. In an important article,
Ronald Coase showed that if negotiating costs are small, then the allocation of re-
sources will be efficient, even if the actions of one party adversely affect the other
party. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
43. See KALT, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC REGULATORY POLICIES ON INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 1-12 (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion
Paper No. 114, March 1985). It is generally recognized that from an efficiency stand-
point such regulations should simulate the precautions manufacturers would take if
they were required to pay for the effects of the pollution. What is now the classic
response to externalities was provided by A.C. Pigou, an economist at Cambridge Uni-
versity in the 1920's. Pigou argued that a tax on polluters equal to the harm they cause
would result in the efficient allocation of resources. Pigou's idea is that the market is
efficient when all costs are internalized and that a properly calculated tax that internal-
izes the effect of the pollution will produce the same result as would be produced by
market forces. A. PIGoU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1946). Alternatively,
if the "correct" level of pollution is known, regulations can be promulgated to achieve
the level. See Davis & Kamien, Externalities, Information, and Alternative Collective
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The justification for safety regulations is less compelling because
the health dangers of production are already incorporated into the costs
of production. If employers systematically took too few safety precau-
tions, employees would either find alternative employment or require
too high a wage for the employer to be able to compete in the product
market. The employment contract between employer and employees
covers not only wages, but also a level of safety, with more dangerous
jobs generally commanding a higher wage. 44
Regulations that set a separate, higher standard are generally
based on paternalism.45 The implicit or explicit assumption is that
someone other than the employees knows what is best for them.4 6 To
say that regulations are paternalistic, however, is not necessarily to
criticize them. On the other hand, to admit that these regulations pro-
mote a valuable end does not imply that they are costless.'7
Whether such regulations are paternalistic or attempt to correct
for externalities, it still must be recognized that the costs of complying
with environmental and safety precautions and the costs from the harm
that the regulations do not prevent are part of the social cost of produc-
tion. Stiff regulations do not make these costs disappear, they only shift
the allocation by reducing the costs from job-related accidents and en-
vironmental harm while raising the cost of compliance. 8
Action, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 4 (2d ed. 1977).
44. See J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, ENERGY ECONOMICS AND POLICY 168 (1980); P.
SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 30, at 619; Cohen, Toward An Economic
Theory of the Measurement of Damages in a Wrongful Death Action, 34 EMORY L. J.
295 (1985); Council Econ. Advisors, Risk and Responsibility, AN ECONOMIC REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT ch. 6 (1987).
45. A more cynical view of these regulations is that they are barriers to entry and
that they actually foster collusive pricing among those already in the regulated indus-
try. If this is true, then a tariff on imports would only promote further collusive pricing.
See Neumann & Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size: Effects of the Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, 25 J. L. & ECON. 183 (1982) (enforcement of act
reduced competition from small mines, benefiting larger mines); Pashigian, The Effect
of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Size and Factor Shares, 27 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1984) (environmental regulation benefited large firms by reducing entry of small
firms).
46. One efficiency enhancing argument in favor of safety regulations is that soci-
ety bears part of the cost of industrial accidents. See VAUPEL, ON THE BENEFITS OF
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION IN THE BENEFITS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGU-
LATION 8-10 (A. Ferguson & E. LeVeen eds. 1981).
47. Complying with federal regulations is costly. Moreover, because compliance is
expensive, regulations can reduce domestic production in favor of increased imports.
For estimates of the effect of environmental regulations on United States trade, see
Kalt, supra note 43, at 13-21.
48. Although regulations cannot entirely eliminate these costs, over some range
DUTIES TO OFFSET
Even though federal and local environmental and safety regula-
tions may promote valuable social goals, they cannot justify offsetting
tariffs. When a product is imported, instead of produced domestically,
the actual costs of production are saved. In addition, the importing
country saves the costs of complying with the environmental and safety
regulations, as well as the costs from pollution and injury.49 If the
goods that the United States gives up in exchange for imported copper
and coal cost less to produce than it would have cost to produce the
coal or copper domestically, then the United States is richer for having
imported the coal or copper.5 0 This is the principle of comparative ad-
vantage once again. It follows that offsetting duties raise the cost to the
United States of consuming coal and copper and, as a result, make the
United States poorer.51 Therefore, the presence of domestic environ-
mental and safety regulations does not justify placing a tariff on com-
peting imports.
There are many legitimate reasons why the costs of complying
with environmental and safety regulations might be lower abroad than
in the United States. First, the costs of achieving the same level of
protection might be higher in the United States. For example, if land
reclamation is a relatively labor intensive activity, and if foreign wages
are relatively low, then the cost of reclaiming land will be higher in the
they may be able to reduce the social cost of production. The regulations are said to be
efficient when they minimize the sum of the compliance and injury costs. See R.
STROUP & J. BADEN, supra note 41, at ch, 7.
49. The costs of conforming with federal, state and local environmental and safety
regulations can be very high. For example, assuming the price of copper is as high as
one dollar a pound, then, according to Senator DeConcini's estimate that it costs cop-
per producers between 10 and 15 cents a pound to comply with federal regulations, the
cost of compliance accounts for more than ten percent of the price. In addition, there
may be significant costs from pollution and industrial accidents.
50. This phenomenon was observed by Adam Smith. "If a foreign country can
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of
them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which
we have some advantage." A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 424 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937)
(London 1776).
51. How can such bills be passed if international trade results in the maximization
of social welfare in the participating countries? The answer is that attempts to restrain
trade succeed because, although the costs of the restraint exceed the benefits, the bene-
fits are concentrated on a well organized few while the costs are spread over many.
Offsetting the cost advantages of foreign coal producers harms American consumers in
the aggregate more than it benefits domestic coal workers in the aggregate. The benefit
to each coal worker, however, far exceeds the cost to any individual consumer. Since
coal workers are better organized, one would expect such a trade restraint to succeed.
See W. ETHIER, supra note 30, at 216-19 (1983); Godak, Industry, Structure, and
Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions, 28 J. L. & EcON. 687 (1985).
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United States."2 Similarly, the costs of reclaiming land depends on the
topography of the land being mined and the richness of the ore.5 3 It is
conceivable that these costs are higher in the United States, especially
for coal mined in mountainous regions and for copper, which has been
depleted more in the United States than in other countries.5 4
Second, some nations may value environmental and safety precau-
tions less than the United States does. Similarly, such nations may not
be willing to pay as high a price for safety and a clean environment.
Protecting the environment and the health of workers is expensive.55
Many countries that are poorer than the United States might not be
willing to pay the high costs that the United States is willing to pay to
protect its workers and environment.56
Third, some of the precautions mandated in the United States by
regulation may be adopted through nonregulatory means abroad. For
instance, firms may make expenditures to avoid the imposition of a pol-
lution tax or to avoid a suit for being a nuisance. In addition, as noted
earlier, it is in the interest of a business to provide the level of safety
for which its workers are willing to pay, even if that level is above that
required by law. Finally, because of moral suasion or stronger govern-
ment involvement in the daily operations of business short of regula-
tion, a foreign firm may make expenditures that would be required by
52. Even within the United States there is substantial variation in the cost of re-
claiming land. M. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39, at 189.
53. J. GRIFFIN & H. STEELE, supra note 44, at 169.
54. "[Tlhe average grade of U.S. copper ore is 35 percent below the average
grade in foreign countries." Unwrought Copper: Report to the President on Inv. No.
TA-201-52, USITC Pub. 1549, at A-71 (July 1984).
55. For an estimate of the cost of environmental regulations that apply to the coal
industry, see M. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39, at 146-50, 189 (1981). Zimmerman also
argues that the Coal Mine and Health Safety Act, which was passed in 1969, has
reduced productivity, thereby raising costs. Id. at 10 (citing J. Baker, Determinants of
Coal Mine Labor Productivity Change, Final Report to the U.S. Dept. of Energy, Con-
tract No. DOE-AC05-760R00033).
56. These bills are not likely to have a significant effect on environmental and
safety precautions taken abroad because of the small portion of coal and copper pro-
duction that is exported to the United States. For example, Chile, the largest exporter
of copper to the United States in 1983, sold 30% of its mined copper in the United
States. Canada, the second largest exporter of copper to the United States, sold only
15% of its mined ore in the United States. Similarly, less than 5% of the coal mined in
Canada and South Africa in 1984 was sold in the United States. See Unwrought Cop-
per: Report to the President on Inv. No. TA-201-52, USITC Pub. 1549, at A-47-53
(tables 20-24) (July 1984); The Position and Competitiveness of the United States in
World Coal Trade, USITC Pub. 1772, Inv. No. 332-182 at 2 (table 1), 28 (table 10)
(Oct. 1985).
1986] DUTIES TO OFFSET
law in the United States. The bills do not provide credit for any such
expenditures.
Before concluding this section, one additional justification for the
tariffs must be addressed. The strongest motives for tariffs have been
the desire to save jobs and to reduce unemployment. 7 Although a tariff
on imported coal will certainly increase jobs in the coal mining indus-
try, it will at most only marginally increase the total number of jobs in
the United States, and only temporarily.58 Tariffs are not an effective
means of creating a permanent increase in total employment. 9
IV. GATT CONSIDERATIONS
Attempts to encourage United States production and employment
through import restraints have a long history.6" The most notable legis-
lative action was the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930. This
Act significantly raised tariffs and was a major contributor to the de-
crease in world trade, and is sometimes blamed for contributing to the
global economic depression that followed.6 1 Fewer than five years later,
57. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 30, at 866.
58. Pearson and Salembier, Adjustment, Protection, and Employment, in INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE: READINGS 83-84 (3d ed. 1986).
59. P. LINDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 30, at 73-77; P. SAMUELSON &
W. NORDHAUS, supra note 30, at 866; PEARSON & SALEMBIER, supra note 58, at 83-
84. From an efficiency perspective, rather than taxing imports of coal and copper, it
might be more appropriate to subsidize imports. Even with environmental regulations,
there will still be pollution. Thus, the private cost of production will be below the social
cost, and the price of domestic coal and copper will not reflect its true cost to the
United States. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 702-13 (1976). In such a case, it would be appropriate to either tax domestic
coal and copper or subsidize imports by an amount equivalent to the monetary value of
the harm caused by the pollution that is not borne by the domestic firm. It is important
to note that the tax or subsidy would be related to domestic pollution, not the relative
cost of domestic and foreign environmental and safety regulations.
60. For a history of United States tariffs, see J. DOBSON, supra note 33, at 5-45.
61. Wilfred Ethier of the University of Pennsylvania described the effects of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, which raised United States tariffs to an all-time high of
59 percent in 1932, as follows:
The result was little short of catastrophic. Within two years, sixty foreign
countries had instituted tariff increases of their own. These countries were con-
cerned both to retaliate against the United States and to stimulate domestic em-
pioyment in the face of the deepening world depression. The mutual increases in
protection canceled each other out, and the resulting dramatic shrinkage in world
trade simply made the Depression worse for all. By 1932 American imports were
only 31 percent of their 1929 level, and exports collapsed in even greater
proportion.
W. ETHIER, supra note 30, at 222 (emphasis deleted).
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the United States retreated from the protectionist position it had
adopted and began to enter into bilateral negotiations with foreign
countries "as a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring
the American Standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemploy-
ment and the present economic depression, in increasing the purchasing
power of the American public, and in establishing and maintaining a
better relationship among various branches of American agriculture,
industry, mining, and commerce . .6.2."I Because international trade
agreements typically contained most-favored-nation provisions, the
United States eventually found it advantageous to engage in multilat-
*eral negotiations and became a signatory to the GATT."3 The GATT
preamble states that it is directed to "the substantial reduction of tar-
iffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce. ' 4
As part of the GATT negotiations, the United States and the
other signatories agreed not to increase their import duties on specific
commodities. 6 The current U.S. tariff treatments of coal and copper
were bound as part of this process. The GATT, however, contains sev-
eral provisions that allow for the imposition of tariffs or quotas, and
sometimes both. GATT signatories can impose duties on dumped"6 or
subsidized imports6 7 that injure a domestic industry.6 8 Neither of these
62. Act of June 12, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316. 48 Stat. 943 (amending the Tariff
Act of 1930 28 U.S.C. §§ 547-50).
63. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 219-21, 45-46
(1969); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
61-64 (1970).
64. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Preamble (hereinafter "GATT").
65. J. JACKSON, supra note 63, at 201-11; K. DAM, supra, note 63, at 17, 18, 25-
55 (1970).
66. Dumping, for purposes of GATT and U.S. law, in the simplest case, involves
the sales of products abroad at less than what they are sold for in the home market.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. 1986). The Second Antidumping Code was signed by
most parties to the GATT, including the United States in 1979.
67. A countervailing duty can be placed on foreign subsidies that are industry
specific. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of GATT, Apr. 12 1979, 26 B.I.S.D. 56 (1980), T.I.A.S. No. 9619. In 1979, at the
urging of the United States, the GATT Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
was adopted. Later that year, Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to
bring United States antidumping and countervailing duty law into conformity with the
GATT. 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
68. No countervailing or antidumping duty may be imposed unless it is deter-
mined that the subsidy or dumping is causing or threatening to cause material injury to
an established industry, or is materially retarding the establishment of a domestic in-
dustry. GATT, supra note 64, art. VI, sec. 6(a). Moreover, it must be shown that the
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exemptions, however, would apply to a law that imposes tariffs to offset
the competitive advantage enjoyed by a foreign producer because its
costs of complying with local environmental and safety regulations
were lower.69
The tariff is not justified under the GATT Escape Clause, which
reserves to member nations the right to withdraw tariff concessions."
The Escape Clause, as incorporated into U.S. law,7' permits a signa-
tory to increase its tariffs or quotas on a product that is imported in
such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to the
competing domestic industry.72 The bills seeking to offset foreign com-
petitive advantages do not require that imports be increasing. In addi-
tion, the bills bypass the causation and serious injury tests.
Additional exceptions from GATT obligations are contained under
the rubric "General Exceptions. ' 73 Three of these merit discussion:74
[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption.75
Exceptions (b) and (g) permit import restrictions that are gener-
ated by health or conservation concerns. Exception (b) might justify
import restrictions on DDT or inflammable dolls.76 Under exception
imports, through the effects of the subsidy or dumping, are causing injury. GATT An-
tidumping Code, Article III, Section 4; GATT Subsidies Code, Article VI, Section 4.
69. If imports of copper are being subsidized, as Senator DeConcini argues, reme-
dies are already available under United States law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
70. GATT, supra note 64, art. XIX.
71. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982).
72. The GATT only requires that the increased imports be a cause of serious in-
jury. United States law requires that the imports be at least as important a cause as
any other. The GATT, however, requires that the increased imports result from GATT
concessions, whereas United States law has no such requirement.
73. GATT, supra note 64, art. XX.
74. For a complete list of the General Exceptions, see J. JACKSON, supra note 63,
at 839-40.
75. GATT, supra note 64, art. XX (a), (b) & (g).
76. In 1969, France applied exception (b) to restrict imports of animal semen and
certain live plants. GATT, Analytical Index: Notes on the Drafting, Interpretation and
Application of the General Agreement, Art. XX-5 (May 1985).
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(b), the United States could also claim that it is necessary to intervene
in foreign economic decisions that produce pollution affecting the
United States (acid rain, for example), but the health and safety con-
cerns related to coal and copper mining and processing are strictly lo-
cal. Moreover, rather than protecting workers and the environment, the
coal and copper bills would increase domestic health and environmental
harm. The offsetting tariffs would increase coal and copper prices,
thereby drawing more mines into production and thus subject the
United States to even more health and environmental damage." As for
exception (g), increasing domestic production of coal and copper would
obviously defeat any domestic policy directed toward preserving natural
resource reserves.
78
Exception (a) permits import restrictions necessary to protect pub-
lic morals. One could argue that it is immoral to pollute and that the
United States is justified in restricting imports to deter foreign nations
from polluting their own environments. The GATT exception, however,
is directed toward domestic morality, not foreign.7 9 For example, this
exception properly could have been invoked during prohibition to pro-
hibit the importation of alcohol.80
77. The only reduction in pollution from raising the duty on coal is from the re-
duced demand for coal to burn. The coal bill, however, is not concerned with pollution
from burning coal, which occurs in the United States whether the coal is mined domes-
tically or imported. It is only concerned with costs incurred by U.S. producers that
foreign producers avoid. Moreover, any concern with pollution from burning coal would
be better addressed by placing a tax on burning coal. This is known as the specificity
rule. See P. INDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 30, at 140-41.
78. A GATT panel determined that a U.S. prohibition of imports of tuna from
Canada was not justifiable under exception (g). See GATT, Analytical Index: Notes on
the Drafting, Interpretation and Application of the Articles of the General Agreement,
Art. XX-9 (May 1985). It is unclear what imports the United States could restrict to
aid in the preservation of exhaustible resources. Perhaps, restraints on gas guzzling
automobiles and coal mining equipment could be justified under this exception.
79. See J. Jackson, supra note 63, at 742-45. The provisions enacted according to
this exception can be found in section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, 19
U.S.C. § 1305 (1982). All deal with domestic morality.
80. The GATT apparently does allow for some paternalism. Exception (e) allows
restraints of trade "relating to the products of prison labor." The United States prohib-
its the importation of goods made from convict labor under Section 307 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982). As part of the Smoot-Hawley Act, this provi-
sion is more likely based in protectionism than in paternalism. The 1930 Act amended
an earlier provision by enlarging its scope to include not only convict labor, but also
forced or indentured labor: "While the sponsor of these changes based his views on
moral concerns-namely that forced labor is morally wrong and that the United States
should not condone its use by importing such goods-it appears that Congress' motiva-
tion in passing the amendment was largely economic." U.S. International Trade Com-
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According to its sponsor, the first purpose of the copper bill is to
improve the world environment by encouraging foreign producers to
adopt environmental regulations similar to those employed in the
United States.81 Even assuming that exception (a) is broad enough to
allow the United States to impose a tariff to encourage foreign govern-
ments to adopt environmental regulations as strict as those in the
United States, the copper bill is not drafted to achieve this purpose.
The bill would increase the tariff on copper by the amount by which
U.S. compliance costs exceed foreign compliance costs. Unless the costs
of controlling pollution are the same in the United States and abroad, a
tariff related to costs will not bring about the same level of pollution.
Moreover, the tariff depends entirely on the difference in the cost of
complying with the government regulations and does not take into ac-
count the actual level of pollution or precautions taken in response to
non-regulatory pressures. Finally, because the United States imports
such a small portion of the copper exports of other countries, it is un-
likely that any country would significantly change its regulations in re-
sponse to the tariff.82 Thus, the first purpose of the copper bill is not
likely to be realized.
The security exception to the GATT, contained in Article XXI,
reads in relevant part:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essen-
tial security interests
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, and imple-
ments of war and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment.8"
This exception might be thought to cover the coal and copper bills be-
mission, International Practices and Agreements Concerning Compulsory Labor and
U.S. Imports of Goods Manufactured by Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor,
USITC Pub. No. 1630, Inv. No. 332-178, at 2 (Dec. 1984).
81. 131 CONG. REC. S914 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985) (statement by Sen.
DeConcini).
82. See supra note 56.
83. GATT, supra note 64, art. XXI.
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cause coal and copper are used by the military.8 ' There are two
problems with this interpretation. First, nearly every product, imported
or not, is used by the military to some degree. Thus, if the tariff on any
product used by the military could be increased without violating
GATT, the Agreement would fall apart.8 6 Second, even if the GATT
exception applied, it would be unwise to impose a tariff to encourage
domestic production of coal and copper for national defense when the
United States could probably satisfy its military demand for coal and
copper more cheaply by stockpiling coal and copper.8 "
Because the tariff increases contemplated under the coal and cop-
per bills do not fall within any of the GATT exceptions, the enactment
of any of these bills would violate U.S. GATT obligations. If the
United States were unilaterally to increase its tariffs on coal or copper,
signatories to the GATT that were adversely affected would be entitled
to compensation. This compensation usually takes the form of a "sub-
stantially equivalent" increase of a tariff on a U.S. export.8 7 Such a
tariff would be likely to reduce profits and domestic employment in the
affected industry. Thus, in addition to extra health and environmental
harm to the United States, whatever employment gains occur in the
short-run from the coal and copper tariffs could be offset by decreases
brought on by retaliation under GATT.
V. CONCLUSION
Several bills were introduced in the 99th Congress that would have
imposed duties to offset competitive advantages allegedly enjoyed by
foreign producers that do not have to meet environmental and safety
standards as strict as those in the United States. Invoking the "level
playing field," supporters of these bills argued that offsetting tariffs are
justified by the existence of environmental and safety externalities in
84. Although no reference to national defense is contained in any of these bills,
other bills have been introduced in Congress that would impose tariffs for national
defense reasons. See, e.g., S. 2779, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) ("A Bill to Amend the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Impose a Fee on the Importation of Crude Oil and
Refined Petroleum Products to Protect the National and Energy Security Interests of
the United States.").
85. In November 1975, Sweden placed quotas on certain footwear, claiming that
the "decrease in domestic production has become a threat to the planning of Sweden's
economic defense in situations of emergency as an integral part of its security policy."
This justification was viewed with skepticism within GATT. GATT, Analytic Index,
supra note 76, at XXI-3.
86. See P. LINDERT & C. KiNDLEBERGER, supra note 30, at 149-50; P. SAMUEL-
SON & P. TEMIN, supra note 34, at 693.
87. See GATT, supra note 64, art. XXVIII, sec. 1.
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the United States. Although such externalities can justify environmen-
tal and safety regulations in the United States on domestic production,
they cannot justify tariffs on goods produced abroad. As the late Pro-
fessor Harry Johnson concluded:
[T]ariffs and other trade interventions justified on grounds of the
existence of domestic distortions cannot lead to the maximization of
real income. The only forms of intervention that can do so are in-
terventions that offset the existing distortions without introducing
new distortions: such interventions are confined to taxes and subsi-
dies on domestic consumption, production, or factor use.88
Those concerned about the decrease in domestic production caused by
U.S. health and safety regulations have several alternatives: (1) weaken
such regulations, (2) subsidize domestic production, (3) do nothing, or
(4) enact ofsetting tariffs. Of these, enacting offsetting tariffs is the
least justified.
88. Johnson, Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: SELECTED READINGS 148 (J. Bhagwati ed. 1981).
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